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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
diction should be no easier to acquire under the RPAPL than under
the CPLR. The court's opinion suggests, however, that where sub-
stituted service under RPAPL 735 conforms with CPLR 308(2), a
money judgment may be recovered despite the absence of personal
delivery of process to the respondent.212
DOLE V. Dow CHEMICAL Co.
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent developments.
On March 22, 1972, the Court of Appeals decided Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co.,218 thereby abolishing the active-passive test for indemni-
fication and establishing a system of equitable apportionment of dam-
ages among joint tortfeasors. The question of its retroactivity was
presented in two recent cases.
In Hain v. Hewlett Arcade, Inc.,214 a property owner impleaded
the contractor which allegedly created the negligent condition that
injured the plaintiff. On March 21, 1972, the Supreme Court, Nassau
County, directed a verdict against the third-party defendant after the
primary action had been settled. The Appellate Division, Second
Department, upheld this procedure subject to proof by a third-party
plaintiff of the reasonableness of the settlement and liability to the
plaintiff permitting recovery over.215 The court, however, remanded
the case for a determination of the relative responsibilities of the tort-
212 Cf. 1405 Realty Corp. v. Napier, 68 Misc. 2d 793, 328 N.Y.S2d 44 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Bronx County 1971). discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. R v. 148, 184(1972) (implying that rent may be recovered in a summary proceeding if service fulfills the
requirements of CPLR 308(4)). But see Leven v. Browne's Business School, Inc., 71 Misc.
2d 842, 843, 337 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (dictum), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L Rzv. 580, 606 (1973) (rent is recoverable only where
process is personally delivered to respondent).
218 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), noted in 37 ALBANY L
REV. 154 (1972); 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 815 (1972); 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 185 (1972). For an ex-
tended discussion of Dole by Professor David D. Siegel, see 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3019,
supp. commentary at 205-38 (1972).
214 40 App. Div. 2d 991, 338 N.YS.2d 791 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
215 Id., 338 N.YS.2d at 793, citing Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. New York Cent.
R.R., 131 Misc. 891, 228 N.Y.S. 508 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1928). The third-party de-
fendant in Hain did not challenge the reasonableness of the settlement.
In Michelucci v. Bennett, 71 Misc. 2d 347, 335 N.YS.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. Washington
County 1972), the court allowed the defendant to implead two former co-defendants with
whom the plaintiff had settled, since the defendant had not been a party to the release.
The question of credit for the settlement payment was not reached. Accord, Williams v.
Town of Niskayuna, 72 Misc. 2d 441, 339 N.YS.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1972)
(also rejecting argument that plaintiff was entitled to recover only for defendant's propor-
tionate liability after settling with third-party defendant). Cf. Vassar v. Jackson, 72 Misc.
2d 652, 340 N.YS.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1973) (1970 general release executed
by defendant in favor of plaintiff-driver barred counterclaim for indemnity as to co-plain-
tiff-passenger's cause of action).
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feasors in light of Dole, holding that Dole "is to be applied retro-
actively, at least as to any case still in the judicial process." 216
In Glomboski v. Baltimore 6- Ohio Railroad,21 7 a tortfeasor's third-
party complaint against the plaintiff's employer was dismissed in 1970
under the active-passive dichotomy. After Dole was decided and al-
though the main action was still pending, the Supreme Court, Monroe
County, subsequently refused to allow the defendant to seek a Dole ap-
portionment, adopting the general rule applied when reargument is
sought after a motion has been decided and the time for appeal has
expired.218
Clearly, under Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co.,219 Dole applies
to all actions decided at the trial or appellate level after March 22,
1972. The decision as to the earlier Glomboski motion should have been
regarded, at best, as the law of the case not binding in the event of an
intervening change in the law. 220
Under Dole, an apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors
is available by impleader or in a separate indemnity action; 22' under
Kelly, it is available by cross-claim. Dole counterclaims have also been
allowed where a plaintiff sues in a representative capacity.222
In Sorrentino v. United States,223 the United States District Court,
Eastern District of New York, allowed a Dole counterclaim against a
plaintiff-father for negligent supervision of the infant plaintiff who had
been injured by the defendant's vehicle. The initial response to this
216 40 App. Div. 2d at 991, 338 N.YS.2d at 793, citing Kelly v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 NE.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
21772 Misc. 2d 552, 338 N.YS.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1972) (mem.).
2181 d. at 554, 338 N.YS.2d at 1005-06, citing Deeves v. Fabric Fire Hose Co., 14 N.Y.2d
633, 198 N.E.2d 595, 249 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1964) (mem.); 2 CARMODY-WArr 2d, § 8: 81, at 100-01
(1965). The Glomboski court suggested that had the plaintiff recovered against the defen-
dant alone, it would have had six years under Dole to sue its co-tortfeasor for indemnity.
In effect, the defendant suffered for its earlier diligence in seeking to implead its co-tort-
feasor.
The Glomboski court also cited Spindell v. Brooklyn Jewish Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d
962, 317 N.YS.2d 963 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 888, 278 N.E.2d 912, 328
N.Y.S.2d 678 (1972), where the cause of action had expired long before a change in the
law.
219 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.YS.2d 851 (1972).
220 See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. 47, Mar. 9, 1973, at 4, col.
3.
221 In City of New York v. Tirone, 72 Misc. 2d 831, 340 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1973), the court allowed the plaintiff to maintain a separate apportionment action
although the defendant had recovered against it in the main action after Dole was decided.
For discussion of the waiver of Dole rights, see 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019, supp. com-
mentary at 230 (1972); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law,
47 ST. JoHN's L Ra. 185, 208 (1972).
222 E.g., Moreno v. Galdorisi, 39 App. Div. 2d 450, 336 N.YS.2d 646 (2d Dep't 1972);
Meade v. Roberts, 71 Misc. 2d 120, 335 N.YS.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1972).
6223 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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tortfeasor and parent -subject to a "pragmatic consideration" of the
infant's age and individual capacity.231 -
The courts which have refused to allow defendants to plead Dole
claims against parents appear to have acted prematurely and "rob[bed]
the defendant of an opportunity to present the facts which might make
out a case against the parent."282
Another frequent Dole claim seeks an apportionment of liability
between a defendant-driver and the driver of the vehicle in which the
plaintiff was a passenger. When the other driver is the plaintiff's spouse,
a question arises as to the obligation of his insurance company to
defend and indemnify him against the claim in light of Insurance Law
section 167(3),88 which provides that no liability insurance policy shall
be deemed to insure against liability incurred because of death of or
injury to one's spouse. In Smith v. Employer's Fire Insurance Co., "
the Supreme Court, Tompkins County, held that section 167(3) absolves
an insurer from defending such a Dole claim, citing an old line of cases
which so held as to third-party indemnity actions by an employer
against a husband after the wife had sued the employer.P 5
The anti-collusion rationale of Insurance Law section 167(3), how-
ever, appears to be irrelevant in many Dole situations, as for example,
when a defendant counterclaims against a co-plaintiff spouse.
An instructive analogy may be that of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, which provides the employee's exclusive remedy against his
employer.236 This has not precluded recovery over from the employer
by a third-party co-tortfeasor sued by an employee.2 7 Hence, the Dole
claim by the defendant against the plaintiff's spouse could be construed
as one purely for indemnity and not an intraspousal claim, thus re-
quiring the insurer to defend and indemnify the spouse.P8
"While Dole was a negligence case, it logically should also apply
231 Id. at 183, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
282 McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. 29, Feb. 9, 1973, at 4, col. 2.
238 N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(3) (McKinney 1966).
284 72 Misc. 2d 524, 340 N.YS.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1972).
285 Eg., Barson v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 1033, 246 N.Ys2d
868 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964); Peka, Inc. v. Kaye, 208 Misc. 1003, 145 N.Y.S2d 156 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1955), retld on other grounds, 1 App. Div. 2d 879, 150 N.Y..2d 774 (1st
Dep't 1956); Fein-an v. Bernard Rice Sons, 2 Misc. 2d 86, 133 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1954), affd mem., 285 App. Div. 926, 139 N.YS.2d 884 (1st Dep't 1955). See
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Katz, 3 Misc. 2d 328, 150 N.Y..2d 667 (Sup. Ct.
Kifigs County 1956).
286 N.Y. WonMEl's Coz,. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1965).
287 See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1972);
Westchester Light Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d
567 (1938).
238 See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J. 109, Dec. 8, 1972, at 5, col. 2.
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development was negative, as typified by the decision of the Supreme
Court, New York County, in Marrero v. just Cab Corp.224 The court
disallowed such a Dole counterclaim on the ground that an allega-
tion of parental negligence based on unattendance alone does not state
a cause of action even if the injured child is non sui juris. 22 15 Two re-
cent cases reached opposite conclusions when presented with counter-
claims against parents for improper supervision of their injured
children.
In Collazo v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating
Authority,228 the Supreme Court, Bronx County, followed the Marrero
rationale. Additionally, the court examined Gelbman v. Gelbman 227
the 1969 Court of Appeals decision which abolished the doctrine of
intrafamily immunity for nonwillful torts. Interpreting Gelbman as
applying primarily in the automobile negligence context where an
insurer is the real defendant in interest in intrafanily suits, the Collazo
court held that the Dole-Kelly-Gelbman revolution "cannot be held
to encompass a counterclaim against a parent for negligent supervision
of an infant injured while crossing, playing or bicycling in the city's
streets, in an action brought to recover for such injuries."22
The Supreme Court, Columbia County, in Holodook v. Spencer,229
rejected this view as violative of the holding in Gelbman. The court
held that under Gelbman a child may recover against a parent for
"'conduct, passive as well as active, that proximately exposes his child
to danger and injury by the conduct of a third person... ,"230 and that
Dole and Kelly allow apportionment of responsibility between co-
22471 Misc. 2d 474, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (eight-year-old
infant plaintiff).
225The court acknowledged that special circumstances, e.g., mental or physical dis-
ability of the child, may require close parental supervision so that a Dole counterclaim
would be appropriate. Id. at 477, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
Accord, Bilgore v. Rennie, 72 Misc. 2d 639, 340 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1973) (14-year-old infant plaintiff). Both Bilgore and Marrero expressed the fear that a
contrary holding would flood the courts with Dole claims against parents.
226 72 Misc. 2d 946, 339 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1972) (5w-year-old infant
plaintiff).
22723 N.Y.2d 434, 245 NE.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969). The Gelbman Court noted
several anomalies in the application of the intrafamily immunity doctrine -it did not
apply to willful torts or if the child was of legal age - and saw the jury system as the major
protection against collusive suits. It concluded that compulsory automobile insurance
"effectively removes the argument favoring continued family harmony as a basis for pro-
hibiting this suit." Id. at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531,
228 72 Misc. 2d at 950, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
229 73 Misc. 2d 181, 340 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1973) (four-year-old
infant plaintiff).
230 Id. at 182, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
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in the strict liability and breach of warranty areas, where liability is
imposed without fault." 289 In Rubel v. StackrowuO the Supreme Court,
Albany County, applied Dole to an action based on a statute imposing
strict liability. The plaintiff sued four tavern owners under the Dram
Shop Act241 for injuries caused by an intoxicated person to whom they
had dispensed liquor. The court allowed one defendant to cross-claim
against its co-defendants for a Dole apportionment, reasoning that this
would not impair the plaintiff's remedy under the statute nor interfere
with the statute's strict liability rule.2
Bartlett v. State23 raised a significant point as to the application of
Dole in the Court of Claims. A driver and a passenger filed claims
against the state after a collision with a state-owned truck. The Appel-
late Division, Fourth Department, affirmed a recovery by the passenger
and the Court of Claims' omission to apportion liability between the
state and the contributorily negligent claimant-driver, reasoning that
to have done so "would [have denied] claimant his right to a jury trial
in the State's action against him."244
The absence of uniform trial procedures for handling Dole claims
for apportionment was the subject of a recent report submitted to the
Board of justices of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, by Justices
Harnett, Oppido, and Widlitz.2 5 Their major recommendation was
increased use by trial judges of the written, special verdict under CPLR
4111 to expedite such claims.-2 6 Ordinarily, three questions would be
submitted to the jury: (1) Which defendants are liable to the plaintiff?
(2) What is their proportionate liability? (3) What are the plaintiff's
damages?2 47 By trying the liability and apportionment issues together,
only one charge would be required, and the special verdict would guide
the jurors.
Dole established a comparative negligence rule among defendants
in the interest of fairness. Its impact on the contributory negligence
289 Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law, 47 ST. JoHN'S
L. REv. 185, 206 (1972). See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S2d 110
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (applying Dole to warranty area).
24072 Misc. 2d 734, 340 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973).
241 N.Y. GEN. Omo. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1964).
242 72 Misc. 2d at 735-36, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
24840 App. Div. 2d 267, 340 N.Y.S-.d 63 (4th Dep't 1973) (per curiam).
244 Id. at 269, 840 N.YS.2d at 64, citing Horoch y. State, 286 App. Div. 303, 143 N.Y.S.2d
327 (3d Dep't 1955).
245 B. HARNETT, A. Oppmo, & P. WmLrz, DoLE v. Dow CHEmeCAL Co. - AN Oums
o CoNsma ATiONS AND RECOmmENDED TR AL PRocEDuE (1973). The report is discussed in
McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. 72, Apr. 13, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
246 See 7B MCKXNNEY's CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 215 (1972).
247 In a bifurcated trial, the first two questions would be submitted during the liabil-
ity phase, the third during the damages phase.
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rule is still open, although Dole reflects the Court of Appeals' recent
dissatisfaction with that archaic and unjust rule,248 and its reasonable-
ness is a compelling argument for the adoption of full comparative
negligence in New York. 49 In Long v. Zientowski,250 the Dunkirk City
Court became at least the third lower court251 to hold that Dole has
already achieved such a result. The court allowed the plaintiff to re-
cover two-thirds of his small property claim arising out of an auto-
mobile accident with the defendant, reasoning that it could not "believe
that the Court of Appeals will not also provide for apportionment of
negligence between plaintiff and defendant when a proper case reaches
it. Any other result would be inequitable. 252
248 Rossman v. LaGrega, 28 N.Y.2d 800, 270 NE.2d 313, 321 N.YS.2d 588 (1971).
249 See Yarish v. Dowling, 70 Misc. 2d 467, 469, 833 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1972) (mem.); 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 217 (1972); Mc-
Laughlin, New York Trial Practice, 167 N.Y.J. 93, May 12, 1972, at 4, col. 1; Note, Dole
v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law, 47 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 185, 209-17
(1972).
250 73 Misc. 2d 719, 340 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Dunkirk City Ct. 1978).
251Berenger v. Gottlieb, 72 Misc. 2d 849, 338 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings
County 1972); Murray v. Lidell, Index No. 1221-69 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Richmond County,
Sept. 27, 1972).
252 73 Misc. 2d at 720, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
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